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III. Abstract 
The number of public companies in the U.S. has steadily declined over the past two 
decades. To help reverse this trend and encourage small businesses to go public and receive 
funding, the U.S. passed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, or JOBS Act, in 2012. This 
law helped small U.S. businesses go public by relaxing many of the typical securities regulations 
a public company would normally face. The part of the law that has gained the most attention is 
Title III, the CROWDFUND Act. This part of the law allows companies, called emerging growth 
companies, to use crowdfunding to issue securities, which was not allowed previously. This 
meant that non-accredited, or retail investors, could now invest in these IPOs. Because these 
emerging growth companies don’t disseminate as much information about themselves as one 
would see from a typical public company, it makes it more difficult for investors to determine if 
an emerging growth company is a successful investment. This additional accessibility to retail 
investors combined with the relaxed reporting requirements led me to investigate whether or not 
investing in emerging growth companies would result in subpar relative returns. This study 
examines stock returns and volatility measures for emerging growth companies that have gone 
public since the passing of Title III of the JOBS Act and finds that these companies have had 
poor relative returns. When looking at the returns for these emerging growth companies, the 50th 
percentile and median of returns is -0.7%, far below the 50th percentile and median of the S&P 
500 and other comparable indices. Preliminary results have also shown these emerging growth 
companies to be more volatile than most other stocks, meaning losses can happen quickly. 
Because these companies have shown to be poor and risky investments thus far while being able 
to take advantage of uninformed retail investors, actions must be taken to increase the reporting 
requirements for emerging growth companies. 
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V. Introduction 
In 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, or JOBS Act, was signed into law after 
being passed with bipartisan support. This law encouraged the funding of small businesses in the 
U.S. by relaxing many of the typical securities regulations a public company would normally 
face. The part of the law that has gained the most attention is Title III, the CROWDFUND Act. 
This part of the law allows companies to use crowdfunding to issue securities, something that 
was not allowed before. This opened up IPOs to non-accredited investors, i.e., retail investors, 
and not just institutional investors that you would see in a normal IPO. On October 30, 2015, the 
SEC adopted final rules allowing Title III equity crowdfunding, and these rules went into effect 
the following May 16. Additionally, Title IV of the JOBS Act, called Regulation A, provided 
another way for these companies to receive funding by allowing companies to raise up to $50 
million using its public solicitation of shares. Because these companies that have gone public 
under the JOBS Act don’t need to report the same information and can receive funding from 
less-knowledgeable people in retail investors, it is hypothesized that investing in these 
companies will offer a significantly worse relative return than similar stocks. 
There has been very little evidence that the JOBS Act has stimulated the IPO market in 
any way. The number of public companies is down a great deal compared to two decades ago, 
and the number of IPOs has been down as of late as well. A large reason for this is that there are 
other ways to receive funding in today’s economic climate. Companies can raise plenty of 
money from venture capital, private equity, and other sources as well. There has been a rise in 
the number of “unicorns”, or startups valued over $1 billion, over the past few years. The reason 
that these companies are called “unicorns” is that it is very rare to see startup companies reach 
these high valuations just as it is rare to see the mythical unicorn. The fact that there has been 
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such a rise in the number of unicorns should raise some questions about the types of valuations 
these companies are getting in the private market. With the money available in the private 
markets and with the JOBS Act increasing the amount of shareholders a company can have by a 
multiple of four before the company has to disclose its financials publicly, it makes sense as to 
why the number of IPOs has declined so greatly over the past few years. 
As some of these high-profile unicorns began to test the IPO market, these companies’ 
valuations plummeted. When Square, Inc. went public in 2015, the public market priced them 
well below their valuation in the private market. German hotel search engine Trivago 
experienced the same situation when it went public in 2016. It became well-known that these 
unicorns were overvalued, yet some companies still decided they wanted to go public. Snap, Inc. 
was one IPO that was of interest to the author of this paper. Snap has yet to make any profits, yet 
their IPO received a lot of hype and media attention. Since it has gone public, their share price 
has decreased tremendously. As these larger, well-known former unicorns have had mixed 
results post-IPO, looking at the other end of the spectrum became something of interest. Would 
the smaller formerly private companies that have utilized the JOBS Act who don’t have to report 
the same amount of financial information fair even worse than the unicorns? An answer to this 
question can be found in this paper. 
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VI. Literature Review  
Since the legislation regarding emerging growth companies was passed in 2015, there is 
not a whole lot of research that has been done on the subject. However, there is plenty of 
research on the topics of IPOs. One of, if not the most knowledgeable sources on IPOs is Jay 
Ritter, a professor at the University of Florida. In Loughran and Ritter’s 1995 paper titled “The 
New Issues Puzzle,” the authors take a look at look at the underpricing of IPOs from 1970-1990 
and their underperformance over the next few years. Loughran and Ritter used the buy-and-hold 
return method and matched each stock in their sample to a similar stock that had not recently 
gone public to measure the performance of stocks. They found that these companies issuing 
stock for the first time underperformed greatly, with the largest underperformance coming in 
months 6-24.  
Since this paper will examine stock returns for up to a year, Mitchell and Stafford’s 2000 
paper titled “Managerial Decisions and Long‐Term Stock Price Performance” is a paper that is of 
interest to the author. Mitchell and Stafford look at the effects of managerial decisions, seasoned 
equity offerings, and share repurchases rather than IPOs, but their methodology for abnormal 
long-run stock performance is useful. To measure stock performance over longer periods of time, 
they use both long-run buy-and-hold return (BHAR) and to the calendar-time portfolio approach. 
The case against using long-run BHAR is that it assumes independence in the abnormal returns 
for stocks, but the case for using long-run BHAR is that accurately represents the investor 
experience. The calendar-time portfolio approach takes into account the fact that abnormal stock 
returns for different companies may not be independent events, but it may have a low power to 
detect abnormal results because it averages over month of “hot” and “cold” returns.  
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Since initial-day IPO results are covered in this paper, taking a look at the literature in 
this area is helpful. Loughran and Ritter (2004) examines IPO underpricing for stock in 1999-
2000. They find the underpricing to be a whopping 65% and offer a few hypotheses as to why 
the underpricing is so high. The most useful explanation they find is the spinning hypothesis, in 
which side payments were made to venture capitalists and executives of the issuing firm, which 
actually increased the incentive to hire a lead underwriter that prices the IPO lower. As more 
regulatory scrutiny regarding spinning came about after the bubble, the underpricing dropped 
back to an average of 12%.  
Another paper written by Jay Ritter from 1991 title “The long-run performance of initial 
public offerings,” looks at the initial-day underpricing and longer-period returns using buy-and-
hold return. Using common stock IPOs from 1975-1984, he finds the initial-day opening return 
at 16.4%. These companies averaged a return of 34.47% over their first three years, severely 
lagging a control group of matched companies which had a return of 61.86%. Another relevant 
study in this area was done by Lowry et al. in 2010. “The variability of IPO initial returns” 
highlighted underwriter’s difficulty in valuing companies with high uncertainty, which is similar 
to the companies that I will be looking at since these emerging growth companies don’t have the 
same reporting requirements. The authors find an average underpricing of 22% between 1965 
and 2005, but a very small amount of stocks is even close to this number. They find that only 
about 5% of the initial returns are between 20% and 25% and that about one-third of the initial 
returns are negative. They also find the standard deviation of these returns to be 55%.  
While there is not a whole lot of literature that looks at emerging growth companies’ 
performance under the JOBS Act, the process of examining both the underpricing of IPOs and 
returns over longer periods has been done many times before. This paper looks at stock returns 
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and volatility measures for newly public companies in ways similar to some of the papers 
mentioned already but looks at stocks that have not been examined very much before. In addition 
to influencing the methodology for this paper, the previous papers have helped develop the 
hypotheses for this paper as well. 
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VII. Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this research project is that emerging growth companies that have gone 
public under Title III of the JOBS Act since May 16, 2016 have had poor stock returns relative to 
comparable indices and have been more volatile compared to the S&P 500 and other comparable 
indices. Because they receive funding from retail investors and crowdfunding, something that 
was not previously permitted, and don’t have to report the same amount of information that a 
company going public normally would, these companies’ stocks will perform worse than the 
market.  
 Returns and volatility measures of emerging growth companies are compared against the 
S&P 500, measured by SPY, the prominent index that tracks the S&P 500. The other indices 
utilized are Wilshire Micro-Cap ETF, WMCR, which is comprised of 2000 microcap stocks, and 
FPX, an index that tracks companies after going public. It is hypothesized that the companies in 
this sample would have worse returns and higher measures of volatility than all of the 
comparable indices. 
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VIII. Methodology 
Data Collection 
 A Bloomberg IPO screen was utilized to find IPOs that fit the necessary qualifications to 
be emerging growth companies. The IPO CACT function provided a way to search for U.S. IPOs 
under $51 million in offering size (the maximum IPO size went slightly over $50M, which is the 
upper limit in offering size to qualify as an emerging growth company under the JOBS Act and 
Regulation A, because some exceptions can be made to companies who receive slightly more 
than $50 million) who announced their IPO past May 16, 2016. Once a list of emerging growth 
companies was compiled, the author found their IPO price on both Bloomberg and the NASDAQ 
website as the majority of these companies are listed on the NASDAQ. Then daily returns for as 
far back as the company has been trading on Yahoo Finance were downloaded. FPX, an ETF that 
tracks IPOs, WMCR, a popular microcap stock ETF, and SPY, an ETF that tracks the S&P 500, 
were used as comparisons for the returns of the stocks in the dataset. 
Data Clean Up 
Each stock in the database was reexamined to make sure it qualified as an emerging 
growth company by looking at the company’s documents, primarily their S-3, on the SEC 
EDGAR website. After verifying that each company in the database was actually an emerging 
growth company, the stocks in the database were looked at to account for dividends. It was 
predicted that these newer stocks, especially ones that weren’t profitable, wouldn’t be paying out 
dividends, and that ended up being the case.  
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IX. Data Analysis 
 To compare the stock returns of the companies in the database and the indices that were 
used as comparisons, 1-day, 1-month, 6-month, and 1-year returns were calculated. I then took 
an average of the returns in my database and compared it to SPY, FPX, and WMCR. Since the 
number of companies in the dataset wasn’t very large, especially for companies with a year of 
return data, the median and the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile were found as the average was not 
always a good representation of the data. These returns were also compared directly against the 
aforementioned indices to find abnormal return. 
 To measure the volatility of the stock in the dataset, beta and annualized standard 
deviation was calculated. To calculate beta, the slope function on Microsoft Excel was used and 
the returns of a selected stock were run against the returns of SPY for the same dates. The 
longest timeframe available was used for the stocks’ beta calculation. For example, if a stock had 
over a year of return information in the dataset, a year’s worth of returns, rather than 6 months or 
1 month of data, was used in the calucaltion. To calculate standard deviation, the standard 
deviation function (stdev.p) on Excel was utilized using the longest timeframe of data available 
in order to calculate daily volatility. In order to annualize the data, the daily volatility numbers 
were multiplied by the square root of 252 (assuming 252 trading days in a year). 
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X. Results 
 The results uncovered in the data analysis stage were similar to what was hypothesized. 
A lot of these companies have not performed well since going public in 2016 or 2017 despite 
favorable conditions in a bull market. The median return for the emerging growth companies in 
my dataset over 1 year was -0.7% while FPX, WMCR, and SPY had a 1-year return of 17.26%, 
28.87%, and 15.99% respectively. This data can be seen below in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
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majority of the money invested in these companies would have been lost over 1 year. At the 
other end of dataset, the 90th percentile of emerging growth companies returned 461.58% over 1 
year. However, there was just one company that heavily influenced this number. Pulse 
Biosciences (Ticker: PLSE) amassed over a 603.5% return in its first year after going public. The 
company’s shares were listed for $4 at their IPO, and at one point the stock price reached over 
$40. As of early April 2018, PLSE’s share price is under $18, still providing a great return since 
the IPO, but a lot of market capitalization has been wiped out. While investing in the 90th 
percentile of emerging growth companies would have been a profitable venture, in order to 
realize much of the gains investors would have had to call the top. This is very difficult for any 
investor to do, let alone a retail investor analyzing a small company that may not be disclosing 
all relevant information.  
Figure 2 
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 On a 6-month basis, the median return for emerging growth companies was 7.2%. This 
fared favorably against the FPX and SPY indices, which returned 4.69% and 4.19% respectively. 
However, these emerging growth companies’ returns lagged behind the returns of WMCR, 
which had a 16.42% return over the 6-month period. These emerging growth companies were 
able to capture some of the momentum that existed in small-cap stocks, but not quite as much as 
one would hope if invested in these emerging growth companies. Abnormal returns for emerging 
growth companies compared to SPY are summarized below in Figure 3. On a 1-month basis, 
emerging growth companies had a median return of -0.1%, which was very similar to the other 
indices. On a 1-day basis, the median return for emerging growth companies was 2%. It is worth 
noting that stock returns for the emerging growth companies in the dataset on a 1-month and 
especially the 1-day basis were heavily influenced by the mechanics of IPO pricing. Whether the 
company was initially priced too high or too low had a major effect on returns, and the return 
numbers on a 6-month and 1-year basis are more informative of the true performance of these 
stocks.  
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Figure 3 
 
 After looking at the betas that were calculated, it could not be confirmed that these 
emerging growth companies were riskier than the market. The beta calculated for the companies 
in the dataset was 0.616. However, this number is probably not truly reflective of how volatile 
these companies are. Every company that had at least one month of returns is included in this 
calculation, and the overall beta was 0.616. However, it is worth noting that there some ectreme 
values that went into this beta. For example, ShiftPixy (Ticker: PIXY) had a beta of over 9.38 
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 While it could not be concluded that these emerging growth companies are more volatile 
than the market based off the beta numbers, it is apparent from the annualized standard deviation 
statistics that these companies are more volatile. Figure 4 shows that for the EGCs in the dataset, 
the 1-month, 6-month, and 1-year standard deviation numbers were 64.80%, 69.83%, and 
88.84%.  FPX and WMCR were more volatile than SPY during these time periods, and neither 
of those indices experienced 15% volatility in any of those time periods. Much of this volatility 
could be a result of IPO underpricing and overpricing and the price movement after going public, 
which typically involves much bigger price swings than the normal market experiences on a 
typical day, but with standard deviations that are so much higher than that of the other 
comparable indices it can be concluded that these emerging growth companies are more volatile 
than the market. 
Figure 4 
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XI. Discussion 
 It was hypothesized that the performance of these emerging growth companies would lag 
the returns of the other comparable indices in addition to being more volatile and risky, and that 
is what has been uncovered in this paper. Having the hypothesis of this paper confirmed is not 
too surprising, but the fact that these companies had a negative median return and standard 
deviations of returns about seven times higher than the comparable indices is quite surprising. 
Despite being in a strong, steady bull market, the median return for emerging growth companies 
was negative. The returns for emerging growth companies varied greatly, with the 10th percentile 
of returns offering a -81% return and the 90th percentile offering a 361.58% return. Seeing a wide 
range of returns like this is somewhat expected since these small IPOs are inherently riskier than 
most other stocks that have been around for a while and have an established track record. In a 
normal risk-return model, one would expect to see these EGCs have a higher return than the 
market average because they are riskier, but again, this is not what we find. 
 The JOBS Act was signed into law with great support, but the findings of this paper 
suggest that the law has had some unintended consequences. A major reason why many private 
companies do not go public is because they don’t want to deal with the extra work, extra costs, 
and scrutiny that comes with being a public company. Having to deal with the SEC can create 
some extra headaches. With some of these laws being relaxed, it has incentivized more small, 
private companies to go public. However, it is possible that some of these companies have been 
going public so the owners of the companies can cash out. It is easy to picture the owners of a 
small, private company seeing this new law allowing them to not deviate too much from their 
current ways while tapping money from the equity market and retail investors, who are known to 
make poor investment decisions. It is very possible that the owners of EGCs make their money 
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once the company goes public, sell their shares to cash out, and then no longer have the incentive 
to stress too much about company performance. This possible explanation for the poor 
performance of emerging growth companies would show the JOBS Act and the CROWDFUND 
Act are acting in unintended ways. While the JOBS Act still seems like a positive from the 
perspective of encouraging innovation from American companies, there clearly seems to be a 
negative impact on investors who are putting their money into these companies. For that reason, 
it may be worth considering taking another look at CROWDFUND Act. 
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XII. Conclusion 
 It was hypothesized in this paper that emerging growth companies would lag the returns 
of comparable indices while also being more volatile. Through the stock return data analyzed, 
the hypothesis has been confirmed. Emerging growth companies experienced an abnormal return 
of -16.69% over a one-year period compared to the SPY ETF. Not only did emerging growth 
companies trail SPY by a significant amount, the median return for emerging growth companies 
was -0.7%. These companies had a median return over a year that was negative despite being in 
a strong bull market where comparable indices WMCR, FPX, and SPY were all up between 
15.99% and 28.87%. 
 Annualized standard deviation numbers show emerging growth companies to be much 
more volatile than comparable indices. Over a 1-year period, emerging growth companies had an 
annualized volatility of 88.84%, compared to just 9.46% for SPY, 13% for WMCR, and 11.91% 
for FPX. Even during a time of relatively little volatility, emerging growth companies had 
extremely volatile returns. While the beta for the dataset was just 0.616, indicating there wasn’t 
very much price movement as the market moves, there were extreme values both positive and 
negative that averaged out to a rather tame beta. These analyses show that emerging growth 
companies have had returns that lag comparable indices greatly when they should outperform 
based on the amount of risk involved with these companies, and that these companies are indeed 
much more volatile. When you combine these bad returns, high levels of volatility, and access to 
non-accredited, or retail, investors, it becomes apparent that these companies have not been 
successful investments and from an investor’s point of view, it may be worth taking another look 
at the elements of the JOBS Act. 
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XIII. Implications/Future Research 
 It is clear that emerging growth companies have not performed well over the time periods 
I have examined. However, further research that gives an update on the performance of these 
companies is something that would be useful to look at. As the market has seen a correction and 
increased volatility in the first few months of 2018, it would be interesting to know how 
emerging growth companies have responded. Another area for future research would be to see 
what has been driving the big winners such as Pulse Biosciences (Ticker: PLSE) and biggest 
losers in the dataset. Are there fundamental reasons why some of these emerging growth 
companies have performed so well or so poorly? Do these companies seem to have exceptionally 
strong balance sheets or income statements that have been driving the upward pressure on their 
share prices? Examining the financials of these emerging growth companies would offer an 
interesting analysis. If there doesn’t seem to be a fundamental reason why these companies have 
either performed so well or so poorly, looking at different behavioral finance phenomena for an 
explanation may also be useful. 
One other area for further research involves the investment banks pricing these IPOs. 
Because these IPOs from emerging growth companies are small, under $50 million in market 
cap, there isn’t as much money to be made by the investment banks for underwriting the IPOs. 
Because of this, the large, brand name investment banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley most likely will not be involved with the underwriting process. Smaller, and probably 
less capable, investment banks will be the ones underwriting the IPOs, which can lead to a more 
inaccurate IPO price. This larger overpricing or underpricing can have a large effect on the 
returns of these stocks. 
 
 
 
22 
 
XIV. Acknowledgements 
 
 
I would like to recognize Roger Bailey for his guidance while running the Honors Contract 
Program. 
 
  
I would also like to recognize Michael Schwert for the time, effort, and assistance he has given me 
throughout the research process.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
XV. Appendix 
Appendix A – Returns for Emerging Growth Companies 
 
Returns
Stock Size Date 1 Day 1 Month 6 Month 1 Year
CLSD US 50.4 01/08/2016 3.57% -1.43% 123.14% 5.29%
TRMT US 50 07/07/2017 -13.55% -15.00%
ASNS US 46 10/20/2017 40.30%
KRYS US 45.54 08/21/2017 6.40% -0.10%
CSTR US 44.592 08/29/2016 6.00% 18.13% 26.67% 20.00%
FLGT US 43.47 09/02/2016 2.00% 0.00% 21.11% -53.00%
TCMD US 41.2 01/25/2016 10.80% 37.70% 49.20% 200.30%
YOGA US 40.15 06/23/2017 -12.72% -26.73%
MRAM US 40 09/09/2016 0.25% -14.50% 8.75% 11.13%
ESQ US 38.059 05/31/2017 8.93% 4.36%
ATXI US 37.95 04/28/2017 37.50% 16.33%
VERI US 37.5 03/15/2017 -12.87% -17.93%
SSTI US 35.42 05/02/2017 30.73% 17.64%
ASV US 30.59 03/24/2017 12.14% 19.71%
GEMP US 30.278 04/18/2016 -8.00% 32.80% 7.20% -0.70%
CSSE US 30 07/17/2017 -22.92% -41.08%
HAIR US 28.7791 09/01/2017 41.71% -4.43%
PBNC US 28.7776 05/26/2016 -20.00% 2.94% 21.59% 51.12%
CELC US 26.22 08/23/2017 50.42% 70.95%
ATOM US 24 06/30/2016 6.67% 28.00% -24.24% -34.53%
FAT US 24 08/03/2017 -5.67% -15.40%
PLSE US 23 12/22/2015 4.25% 8.75% 49.25% 603.50%
POLA US 19.32 09/09/2016 28.57% 19.00% -26.00%
PZRX US 18.5 04/18/2016 0.40% -3.60% -76.00% -77.00%
RMBL US 16.005 09/01/2017 -7.45% -1.82%
SNES US 15 09/21/2016 2.00% -2.13% -29.88%
SACH US 13 10/28/2016 -4.99% -5.75% -4.57%
ADOM US 12.5 04/25/2017 45.00% 155.00%
AIRG US 12 07/15/2016 0.00% 66.00% 106.13% 23.88%
PIXY US 12 11/21/2016 28.33% -4.33%
LEVB US 12 09/18/2017 1.81%
ACMR US 11.2 09/13/2017 8.04%
MBRX US 9.24 02/01/2016 33.33% 14.17% -56.17% -87.00%
MSDI US 9.1125 11/10/2015 -29.56% -30.67% -70.67% -75.33%
CODX US 7.071 04/28/2017 -3.17% -30.00%
AMRH US 6.0696 09/18/2017 -15.29%
NAOV US 6.0001 06/21/2017
AZRX US 5.28 07/13/2016 -9.45% -17.45% -27.76% -33.42%
BYSI US 3.486 11/15/2016 -16.00% -0.15% 82.55%
Average EGC 6.04% 8.11% 8.14% 35.98%
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Appendix B – Returns for Selected Indices 
  
Appendix C – Percentile Returns for Emerging Growth Companies 
 
Appendix D -  Emerging Growth Company Annualized Standard Deviations 
 
Appendix E – Comparable Index Betas 
1 Day 1 Month 6 Month 1 Year
FPX -0.60% -0.99% 4.69% 17.26%
WMCR -0.20% 1.53% 16.42% 28.87%
SPY -2.12% -1.37% 4.19% 15.99%
1 Day 1 Month 6 Month 1 Year
10th Percentile -16.00% -28.04% -70.67% -81.00%
50th Percentile 2.00% -0.10% 7.20% -0.70%
90th Percentile 40.30% 49.02% 106.13% 361.58%
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  Beta 
EGC 0.62 
FPX 1.15 
WMCR 0.94 
SPY 1 
 
 
Appendix F – Annualized Standard Deviation of Returns 
 
Appendix G – Emerging Growth Company Betas 
  Beta 
CLSD 0.57 
TRMT 2.11 
KRYS 1.03 
CSTR 0.62 
FLGT 0.21 
TCMD 0.47 
YOGA -1.87 
MRAM 1.39 
ESQ  -1.25 
ATXI -5.92 
VERI 0.96 
SSTI 2.96 
ASV  -0.38 
GEMP 0.74 
CSSE 4.08 
HAIR -2.48 
PBNC 0.43 
CELC -3.81 
ATOM 0.10 
FAT  0.72 
1 Month 6 Month 1 Year
EGC 64.80% 69.83% 88.84%
FPX 11.36% 14.08% 11.91%
WMCR 14.11% 14.30% 13.00%
SPY 8.12% 11.43% 9.46%
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PLSE 0.19 
POLA 1.55 
PZRX 1.50 
RMBL 0.88 
SNES 1.84 
SACH -0.42 
ADOM 2.09 
AIRG 3.10 
PIXY 9.38 
MBRX 0.83 
MSDI 0.10 
CODX 1.35 
AZRX -3.69 
BYSI 1.55 
Avg. 
Beta 0.62 
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